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EMPLOYMENT LAW - HERE'S LOOKING AT You: HIGH TECH 
"PEEPING" IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE ROLE OF TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Hypothetical 
Janet Johnson, a 31 year-old woman, worked for a prominent 
insurance company in the hypothetical city of Newfield. Every af­
ternoon on her lunch break, Johnson went for a run around the city 
park. This practice had become habit a few years before when 
Johnson's employer installed showers and a changing area for em­
ployees who wished to exercise during work hours. Six months ago, 
however, Johnson stopped running. She stopped working for the 
insurance company. In fact, she stopped working all together. 
After her last run in the park, Johnson headed to the women's 
locker room to shower. She undressed in the changing area, 
wrapped herself in a towel, and walked to the adjacent showers. 
Once showered and dressed, Johnson approached the mirror to do 
her hair and makeup, but noticed that the mirror was askew. Look­
ing at the upper corner, she saw a small black object protruding out 
of the wall. When Johnson examined the object closer she realized 
it was a miniature camera. 
An investigation revealed that the camera was part of an elab­
orate "peeping" system originating in the office of Johnson's super­
visor, who had been viewing the women on an office television. The 
supervisor was fired and the system was dismantled. But for John­
son removing the camera was not enough, and she became para­
noid and self-conscious at work. Her emotional state became so 
unstable that she was no longer able to perform her job duties and 
struggled just to remain in the office. Johnson eventually resigned 
from the insurance company and has not yet returned to work. 
Johnson visited her lawyer to discuss the claims against her for­
mer supervisor. The attorney contemplated state and common law 
tort claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emo­
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tional distress.1 But realizing that such claims against the supervi­
sor himself would afford his client minimal compensation, 
Johnson's lawyer suggested an aggressive alternative focusing on 
the insurance company as an employer. The claim he proposed: 
hostile work environment sexual harassment, resulting in a con­
structive discharge in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.2 
B. 	 The Prevalence of Workplace "Peeping" and Title VII 
Protection 
Janet Johnson's situation is not isolated or restricted to a hypo­
thetical. The sophisticated "peeping" by Johnson's supervisor is 
considered a form of "video voyeurism," a practice that involves 
videotaping or viewing others without knowledge or consent, usu­
ally for a sexual purpose.3 Video voyeurism is likely to become 
prevalent in the workplace due to the advent of surveillance tech­
nology that provides "peeps" greater access to private areas with 
less risk of detection.4 As a result of such technology it is estimated 
that "[m]ore than 20,000 women, men, and children are unknow­
ingly taped everyday in situations where the expectation and the 
right to privacy should be guaranteed, i.e., while showering, dress­
ing, using a public restroom, or making love in their own homes."5 
The number is so outrageously high because the technology is 
cheap, easy to use, and virtually undetectable.6 
Traditional "peeping" has already infected the workplace and 
has been characterized as "an emerging issue in employment law."7 
With the addition of surveillance equipment the number of victims 
1. See generally Clay Calvert and Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and 
the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
469, 555-59 (2000) (listing the civil remedies for the gathering of sexual images without 
consent). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000(e) (2000). 
3. Video voyeurism has been defined as "[t]he use of any camera, videotape, 
photo-optical, photo-electric, or any other image recording device for the purpose of 
observing, viewing, photographing, filming, or videotaping ... for a lewd or lascivious 
purpose." Calvert, supra note 1, at 521 (citing 1999 La. Acts 1240). 
4. Dana Hawkins, Cheap Video Cameras are Monitoring Our Every Move, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 17, 2000, at 52 ("With miniature cams now selling for 
under $100, it's much cheaper to be a spy than to catch one."). 
5. Calvert, supra note 1, at 476-77 (quoting LOUIS R. MIZELL JR., INVASION OF 
PRIVACY 23 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). 
6. Id. at 480-82. "[B]y using pinhole cameras that may capture images through a 
space the size of a nail hole in the wall, just about anything imaginable is possible." Id. 
at 482. 
7. Id. at 559 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 307 (1994)). 
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and the severity of the harassment can only increase. Title VII is 
the proper statute to address and combat this form of workplace 
harassment before it becomes prevalent. As the doctrine pre­
scribed to eliminate discriminatory harassment in the workplace,s 
Title VII can adequately compensate victims and deter future acts 
of voyeurism.9 Specifically, Title VII encourages employers to cre­
ate harassment policies and procedures in an effort to prevent 
harassing conduct. lO Title VII also has the power to deter "peep­
ing" by holding employers liable for damages, thereby enticing 
them to exercise greater control over supervisors and employees. l1 
When deterrence fails, Title VII can make victims "whole" through 
compensatory and punitive damages.12 Title VII's "make whole" 
provision would award deserving plaintiffs like Janet Johnson their 
lost wages13 in addition to any compensation for lasting emotional 
InJunes. 
Joanna Ciesielski, a former employer of Hooters of America, 
realized the benefit of Title VII protection when she was "peeped" 
at work.14 Ciesielski used a changing facility in the restaurant to get 
dressed for her shift until she noticed reoccurring holes in the 
walp5 The changing room was directly adjacent to the employee 
break room and Ciesielski suspected that she had been watched on 
8. 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2(a)(I)(2000); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405,417 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
9. See Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of Ti· 
tie VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 
651, 652 (1993) (stating that according to the language of the statute and the legislative 
history Title VII has both a remedial and deterrent purpose). 
10. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). See 29 C.F.R. 
1604.11(f) ("Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An 
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring 
...."). 
11. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1981a(b)(3)(2000) (allowing compensatory recovery for "future pecuniary losses, 
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and 
other nonpecuniary losses" when an employer violates 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2). The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 also provides for punitive damages if an employee "demonstrates 
that the [employer] engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices 
with malice or with reckless indifference." 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(I). 
12. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418 ("It is ... the purpose of Title VII to 
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination."). 
13. 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5(g)(I)(2000). 
14. Ciesielski v. Hooters of America, Inc., No. 03-C-1175, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14478 (N.D. III. July 27, 2004). 
15. Id. at *9-11. 
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numerous occasions.16 Feeling as though she had been sexually 
harassed, Ciesielski brought a Title VII action against her employer 
and was awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in 
punitive damagesY 
The traditional hole-in-the-wall approach used by the perpetra­
tors at Hooters will give way to high tech "peeping" as surveillance 
equipment becomes more obtainable and less detectible.18 In addi­
tion, video surveillance equipment is already present in numerous 
workplaces to counteract theft, drug-use, and even sexual harass­
ment among employees.19 The ease with which a perpetrator could 
"[c]ross[] the line from permissible surveillance ... to illegal video 
voyeurism"20 enhances the probability that "elaborate peeping and 
videotaping scheme[s]"21 will develop within the workplace. 
Even the most innocent employment atmospheres are suscepti­
ble to a "peeping" scandal. In 1991, a Walt Disney World employee 
secretly viewed and videotaped a group of female performers who 
were undressing and using the bathrooms.22 The videotaping went 
on until 1992 when, for evidentiary purposes, Disney taped the per­
petrator taping the females.23 The Disney video captured the em­
ployee "masturbating, observing, and videotaping" the females for 
over an hour. 24 The victims sued for, among other things, sexual 
harassment under Title VII.25 
Women and men26 alike are being spied on in bathrooms, 
showers and private changing areas, not by the sleazy window 
watcher outside their homes, but by supervisors or co-workers at 
their places of employment.27 The result: more victims like Janet 
16. Id. at *9. 
17. Ciesielski v. Hooters Management Corp., No. 03-C-1175, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25884, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2004). 
18. See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 52. Counter Spy Shop, a manufacturer of tiny 
cameras, sold 125,000 covert cameras in 1999. Id. The Shop will install cameras in a 
variety of objects, including sunglasses, smoke detectors, lamps, and watches. Id. 
19. See Ron Dixon, Nowhere to Hide: Workers are Scrambling for Privacy in the 
Digital Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'y 1, 9 (1999) ("[T]he Orwellian nightmare of the 
Thought Police and Big Brother appears to reflect reality."). 
20. Calvert, supra note 1, at 549. 




25. Jd. at 1500. 
26. See Clement v. ITT Sheraton Boston Corp., Mass. Super. Ct. (No. 93-0909-F) 
(describing how a group of male union workers were videotaped in a locker room with­
out consent). 
27. Hawkins, supra note 4, at 52. Female employees discovered a miniature cam­
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Johnson and a growing number of Title VII sexual harassment 
claims. 
C. The Challenge Facing Title VII Plaintiffs 
Although seeking recovery under Title VII for this type of har­
assment is attractive and arguably proper, it is not done without 
difficulty. High-tech "peeping" is a type of sexual harassment 
under Title VII as it occurs because of the employee's sex28 and 
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with [an em­
ployee's] work performance" by "creating [a] ... hostile, or offen­
sive working environment."29 Recovery is difficult, however, 
because courts have constructed a Title VII framework specifically 
designed to deal with more traditional forms of sexual harassment. 
Typically, Title VII cases involve some level of interaction between 
the harasser and the victim, such as touching or verbal exchange. 
"Peeping" within the workplace, therefore, is not a traditional form 
of sexual harassment that fits squarely within the framework 
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC)30 and the courts. 
Title VII has always been construed liberally, however, to 
adapt to changing perceptions of what constitutes sexual harass­
ment. In the past decade alone, courts have expanded the reach of 
Title VII to include less obvious forms of harassment, such as sug­
gestive sexual photographs31 or the presence of foul language in the 
workplace.32 Moreover, as the societal definition of "sex" itself is 
changing, sexual harassment claims are extending to areas of same­
sex harassment33 and harassment based upon sexual orientation.34 
era in the bathroom ceiling and uncovered an entire surveillance system linked to a 
television in a supervisor's office. Id. 
28. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("[W]hen a supervi­
sor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
'discriminates' on the basis of sex."). 
29. 29 c.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990). 
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1990) ("Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex"). 
31. Vigil v. City of Las Cruces, 119 F.3d 871, 875-76 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
the plaintiff's Title VII claim was actionable because she was "exposed to pornographic, 
sexually explicit pictures"). 
32. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting 
that foul language is included in the "totality of the circumstances" analysis when decid­
ing whether a hostile work environment was created). 
33. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) 
(holding that same-sex harassment was not the type of harassment contemplated by the 
drafters of Title VII, but is a comparable evil entitled to protection). 
34. See Jeff Mitchell, Title VII's "Sex Life", 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 137, 144-46 
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By constantly reevaluating the parameters of Title VII, the courts 
recognize that it is a "living" doctrine that must change as we 
change. High tech "peeping" within the workplace is a new brand 
of sexual harassment, and because of its severe and humiliating 
character, it is also the precise type of harassment that deserves Ti­
tle VII protection. 
This Note argues that when supervisors use surveillance de­
vices to view or videotape employees in areas of extreme privacy, a 
Title VII hostile work environment is created and employers should 
be held liable. Furthermore, this Note will demonstrate that em­
ployer liability is the critical element in achieving the elimination of 
video voyeurism in the workplace and providing adequate compen­
sation for victims. Part I of this Note provides a background detail­
ing the legal evolution of sexual harassment and the scope of 
employer liability under Title VII. This section focuses primarily on 
the parameters of hostile work environment harassment, with spe­
cific attention to the changing perception of "hostile" conduct. Part 
II presents an analysis of the Title VII framework as it applies to 
the hypothetical situation presented in the Introduction. This sec­
tion will illustrate how the evolving structure of Title VII can effec­
tively prevent "peeping" and compensate victims. Finally, Part II. 
C proposes an equitable solution as a compromise between policy, 
prior precedent and common sense. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Sexual Harassment under Title VII 
Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress did not 
expressly address the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace, 
but rather discrimination based on "sex."35 In fact, there is evi­
dence that Congress did not want to address the issue of "sex" at 
all, and only added the category as an attempt to defeat the entire 
bil1.36 But Title VII passed, and it declared unlawful all employ­
(2003) (discussing the expansion of Title VII and the case for protection from harass­
ment based on sexual orientation). 
35. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of ... sex. "). 
36. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective 
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (explaining that "sex" was added to 
Title VII at the eleventh hour in hopes of defeating the legislation); see Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 
(illustrating that Title VII, as originally proposed, only included discrimination based on 
"race, color, religion, or national origin"). 
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ment practices that "discriminate against any individual with re­
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin."37 
With little or no legislative history as a guide, early judicial in­
terpretations of Title VII proved inconsistent. Some courts looked 
to the literal language of the Act and held that harassment was not 
a form of discrimination that Title VII was intended to prevent.38 
In Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc. 39and Miller v. Bank of 
America,40 for instance, the courts treated sexual harassment as a 
personal affront, one which "satisf[ied] a personal urge,"41 instead 
of a discriminatory act. Other courts interpreted Title VII broadly. 
In Barnes v. Castle the court rejected the Corne and Miller ap­
proach, stating that, "[b]ut for [the employee's] womanhood" she 
would not have suffered the harassment.42 Therefore, the Barnes 
court held, the harassment was based on gender, creating a "prima 
facie case of sex discrimination."43 
In 1980, Congress finally offered an interpretation of "sexual 
discrimination" through the Equal Employment Opportunity Com­
mission (EEOC)44 Guidelines, which laid a framework for analyz­
ing sexual discrimination claims under Title VII.45 Adopting the 
Barnes interpretation, the EEOC Guidelines established that 
"[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of ... Title VII."46 
Furthermore, the EEOC Guidelines set out two forms of sexual 
37. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
38. See Michael Rubenstein, The Law ofSexual Harassment at Work, 12 INDUS. 
1, 3 (1983) (discussing the view that Title VII as civil rights legislation was intended to 
prevent discrimination, not harassment). 
39. 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
40. 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("[I]t would seem wise for the Courts 
to refrain from delving into these matters short of specific factual allegations describing 
an employer policy which in its application imposes or permits a consistent, as distin­
guished from isolated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group."). 
41. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163. 
42. 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
43. Id.; see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[T]he plain­
tiff's supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one 
gender and not the other ....") (rev'd on other grounds). 
44. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 (2000)). The EEOC is the government agency 
designed to interpret and enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. 
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1990). 
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 
703 of Title VII. "). 
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harassment: "quid pro quo" and hostile work environment.47 
"Quid pro quo" harassment occurs when cooperation with sexual 
requests "is made . .. a term or condition of an individual's em­
ployment," or when a "rejection of such [request] is used as the 
basis for employment decisions. "48 Harassment in the form of a 
hostile work environment occurs when harassing conduct "has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment. "49 While prior case law established that 
"quid pro quo" harassment violated Title VII,50 the EEOC was the 
first authority to argue that a sexually hostile work environment, 
absent a negative impact on tangible job benefits was actionable 
under Title VIPl 
The standards set forth by the EEOC for sex-based claims, spe­
cifically hostile work environment harassment, mirrored the stan­
dards used by courts in similar race or national ongm 
discrimination cases.52 By adopting uniform standards of harass­
ment that applied to sex as well as "race, color, religion or national 
origin,"53 the EEOC heeded Congress's message in the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972.54 Congress stated that "wo­
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. The 1980 Guidelines specifically establish: 

Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 

physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) sub­

mission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condi­

tion of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 

conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affect­

ing such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreason­

ably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an 

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 

[d. 
50. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a plaintiff 
who was terminated for refusing sexual requests could assert a claim for recovery under 
Title VII). 
51. After EEOC Guidelines were published, courts unanimously allowed for hos­
tile work environment claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (declaring a violation of Title VII on two grounds, quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment). 
52. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that an em­
ployer created an offensive work environment by giving discriminatory service to His­
panics); see also Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 
514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding a discriminatory hostile environment when African 
American firefighters were segregated at workplace events). 
53. 29 C.F.R. 1604.11 n.1 ("The principles involved here continue to apply to 
race, color, religion or national origin. "). 
54. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.c. 2oo0e-4 (2000)). 
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men's rights are not judicial divertissements. Discrimination 
against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited em­
ployment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social 
concern given to any unlawful discrimination."55 Despite the per­
suasive nature56 of the EEOC Guidelines, it was not until Merilar 
Savings Bank v. Vinsan 57 that the Supreme Court adopted them 
and established a binding precedent. 
In Meritar, the Court quickly affirmed that sexual harassment 
is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title VII, stating 
that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a 
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'dis­
criminate[s], on the basis of sex."58 More detailed, however, was 
the court's discussion of hostile work environment harassment. The 
plaintiff in Meritar was a bank employee who claimed she suffered 
sexual harassment at the hands of her supervisor who "touch[ed]" 
and "fondl[ed]" her, and eventually forced her to have inter­
course.59 The plaintiff was not fired, demoted or transferred for 
objecting to this harassment, and hence did not assert quid pro quo 
harassment. Instead, she argued that she was the victim of constant 
sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment.60 
The Court agreed that a hostile work environment violates Ti­
tle VII according to the express wording of the statute.61 Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against an employee "with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."62 
One of the "privileges" that an employee enjoys is the "right to 
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridi­
cule, and insult."63 The Court concluded that the phrase "terms, 
conditions or privileges" provides employees protection from 
55. H.R. REp. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971). 
56. The EEOC Guidelines, "'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of 
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.' " Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986) (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 
141-42 (1976». 
57. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
58. Id. at 64. 
59. Id. at 60-61. 
60. Id. at 60. 
61. Id. at 64 
62. 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
63. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th 
Cir. 1982) ("Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for 
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace 
that racial harassment is to racial equality."). 
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"'working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as 
to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of 
...workers.'''64 By upholding hostile work environment harass­
ment, the Court rejected a statutory reading that would allow re­
covery only when the harassment produced a tangible economic 
consequence.65 The Supreme Court stopped short, however, of 
holding that all unwelcome66 crude or sexual behavior within the 
workplace creates a hostile work environment.67 
To state a claim for hostile work environment harassment, the 
employee must establish that the alleged conduct was "sufficiently 
severe or pervasive" so as "'to alter the conditions of [his/her] em­
ployment.' "68 This language excludes much of the boorish and 
crude behavior that does not rise to the level of "severe or perva­
sive."69 But the Meritor Court emphasized that what is "severe and 
pervasive" should be determined by looking at the "totality of the 
circumstances,"7o including the frequency of the harassment and its 
humiliating character.71 Therefore, an actionable hostile work envi­
ronment can arise if "'a single incident was extraordinarily severe, 
or [if] a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and con­
certed to have altered the conditions of [the employee's] work 
environment.' "72 
Although lower courts had hoped the Meritor decision would 
provide them with guidance, what they actually received was more 
uncertainty. It was clear that there were two actionable forms of 
64. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1971)). 
65. Id. at 64-65. 
66. Id. at 68. The issue is not whether participation was voluntary, but whether 
the sexual advances were unwelcome. Id. 
67. Id. at 67 ("Of course ... not all workplace conduct that may be described as 
'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning 
of Title VII."). 
68. Id. (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238). 
69. See Melissa R. Null, Disrespectful, Offensive, Boorish & Decidedly Immature 
Behavior Is Not Sufficient to Meet the Requirements of Title VII, 69 Mo. L. REv. 255, 
259 (2004) (discussing how crude behavior that made the plaintiff feel "uncomfortable 
and embarrassed" was not enough to constitute a hostile work environment); see gener­
ally Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (denying a hostile 
work environment claim despite allegations that the plaintiffs supervisor propositioned 
her and insulted her work product). 
70. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)). 
71. Id.; see Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993). 
72. Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
99 2005] HERE'S LOOKING AT YOU 
sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.13 
But courts now had to determine what constituted "severe and per­
vasive" conduct with little or no direction from the Supreme 
Court,74 
B. Evolution of the Hostile Work Environment 
1. Defining and Redefining the Framework 
In the years following Meritor, courts continued to pursue the 
goal of equalizing the workplace by eliminating discriminatory or 
harassing conduct. It became clear that, to achieve this objective, 
the Title VII framework would have to adapt and expand to encom­
pass changing styles and social perceptions of sexual harassment,75 
"Title VII was not created with an expiration date," and if courts 
refused to apply Title VII "according to ... social developments," 
the statute's anti-discrimination purpose would be lost,76 
Recognizing the need for malleability, Congress amended and 
supplemented Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, reaffirm­
ing the purpose of Title VII and emphasizing the importance of de­
terrence.17 In response to concerns that victims' needs were not 
being properly met under Title VII, Congress "expanded the ability 
of the courts to make victims of discrimination whole" by allowing 
plaintiffs to seek compensatory and punitive damages.18 The inten­
tion of the 1991 amendments was to further encourage employers, 
who could now suffer higher damages, to prevent, rather than cor­
rect, inappropriate conduct.79 
73. Specifically, to recover under a hostile work environment claim a woman 
must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwel­
come sexual advances; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected 
a "term, condition or privilege of employment"; and (5) the employer is liable. Katz v. 
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). 
74. The Meritor court also left unresolved the issue of employer liability for hos­
tile work environments created by supervisors. Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote, "We ... 
decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but we do 
agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look at agency principles for 
guidance in this area." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. A discussion of employer liability, as 
alluded to in Meritor, can be found in Part II. C of this Note. 
75. "Title VII vows to protect against discrimination 'because of ... sex.' Not 
only sex as understood in 1964, but sex as it evolves through time." Mitchell, supra 
note 34, at 150 (discussing the applicability of Title VII in cases of harassment based 
upon sexual orientation). 
76. Id. 
77. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scat­
tered sections of 42 U.S.c. and 2 U.S.c.). 
78. Follette, supra note 9, at 655. 
79. Id. at 657. Prior to the 1991 amendments, plaintiffs were only entitled to equi­
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In addition, the Supreme Court began expanding the tradi­
tional Title VII framework in 1993 when it interpreted the "severe 
and pervasive" standard in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.8o The 
plaintiff in Harris sought to recover under Title VII for sexual har­
assment in the form of a hostile work environment.8l The harasser, 
the president of Forklift Systems, Inc., repeatedly directed "un­
wanted sexual innuendos" at the plaintiff and indicated that her in­
abilities were a direct result of her gender, stating, "You're a 
woman, what do you know?" and, "We need a man as the rental 
manager."82 The District court held that although the president's 
comments were offensive, they were not "so severe as to be ex­
pected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well-being."83 The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected the suggestion that the victim 
must suffer a psychological injury for the harassment to be "severe 
and pervasive."84 Title VII, the Court held, "comes into play before 
the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown."85 Instead, 
whether conduct is sufficiently "severe and pervasive" requires an 
objective/subjective analysis of the victim and the circumstances.86 
If the harassing conduct is objectively hostile, in that a reasonable 
person would find the conduct offensive or abusive, and the victim 
subjectively perceives the harassing behavior to be so, then such 
table damages, and if they suffered no economic injury as a result of the harassment 
they could not, realistically, recover anything. By allowing compensatory and punitive 
damages, "the amendments forc[ed] employers to heighten their awareness of discrimi­
nation." Id. 
80. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
81. [d. at 19. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 20 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. A-34 to A-35). The District court based 
its reasoning on Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), 
which held that conduct only creates an abusive environment when it seriously affects 
the well-being of the victim and causes an injury. 
84. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. But see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Vance v. Southern 
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (both holding, 
prior to Harris, that the harassment must be severe and pervasive enough to effect a 
plaintiffs emotional well-being). 
85. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
86. Id. at 21-22; see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-88 (9th Cir. 1991). 
[I]n evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should 
focus on the perspective of the victim; ... [but,] [i]n order to shield employers 
from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sen­
sitive employee, we hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of 
hostile environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a rea­
sonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. 
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79. 
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conduct violates Title VII despite the lack of a "psychological 
injury."87 
The Harris court also reinforced that "whether an environment 
is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the 
circumstances ... includ[ing] the frequency ... [and] severity, ... 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating ... and whether 
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."88 
The practical effect of this holding is that even when no one inci­
dent is "severe and pervasive" enough to create a hostile work envi­
ronment, individual actions taken in the aggregate could easily 
meet this standard. Therefore, the holding in Harris, while taking 
the "middle path between making actionable any conduct that is 
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psy­
chological injury," still had the effect of expanding the reach of Ti­
tle VIJ.89 Harris also served to broadly define the "severe and 
pervasive" standard for recovery, ultimately stating that "severe 
and pervasive" includes, but is not limited to, an injury to the vic­
tim's psychological well-beingYo 
Armed with the subjective/objective standard and the "totality 
of the circumstances" test from Meritor and Harris, the Supreme 
Court went on to confront, for the first time, how changing societal 
perceptions and cultural norms would affect the definition of "se­
vere and pervasive" sexual harassment. In Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,91 the issue was whether Title VII was in­
tended to combat same-sex sexual harassment. In a relatively short 
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that Title VII protects in­
dividuals from same-sex harassment,92 although this type of harass­
ment was "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned 
with when it enacted" the statute.93 The court recognized that 
"'discrimination ... because of sex' must extend to sexual harass­
ment of any kind"94 regardless of whether "sex" is defined by gen­
der, orientation, or social stereotypes.95 
87. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
88. Id. at 23. 
89. Id. at 21. 
90. /d. at 22. 
91. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
92. Id. at 82. "[W]e hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of 
discrimination 'because ...of sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant. ..are 
of the same sex." Id. at 79. 
93. Id. at 79. 
94. Id. at 79-80 (citing 42 U.S.c. 2000e (2000». 
95. Implicit in the Oncale holding is the extension of Title VII protection to those 
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Clearly establishing that same-sex harassment was actionable 
under Title VII, the Court rejected the idea that this extension 
would "transform Title VII into a general civility code for the 
American workplace. "96 In an effort to control the scope of Title 
VII, the court reaffirmed the subjeoctive/objective components of a 
hostile work environment claim, and stressed that "same-sex har­
assment ... requires careful consideration of the social context in 
which particular behavior occurs."97 "Common sense,"98 the court 
noted, would dictate whether non-sexual behavior was harassment 
or just "roughhousing" as usua1.99 
The importance of Oncale goes beyond the realm of same-sex 
or opposite-sex sexual harassment, to demonstrate more broadly 
how culture can affect the interpretation of statutory language. 
Discrimination based on "sex," as defined in 1964, would not have 
included harassment because of one's sexual orientation or un­
feminine-like characteristics. But the trend among courts, particu­
larly the Supreme Court, has been to read Title VII liberally,lOO and 
to structure a framework that encompasses much of the harassing 
and discriminatory conduct that causes a hostile environment with­
out discarding the statutory requirement that the harassment affect 
who are sexually harassed, even though that harassment is not motivated by a sexual 
desire. But see McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that same-sex harassment may be based on "the perpetrator's 
own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity...but not specifically 'because of' the 
victim's sex"). For instance, in Oncale, the plaintiff was a male who, whether homosex­
ual or not, was harassed by heterosexual men within the workplace because they be­
lieved him to be homosexual. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77-78. This harassment or 
discrimination may not have been the result of sexual attraction, but it was the result of 
the plaintiff's gender and sexual perception. Id. at 79-89. 
96. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
97. Id. at 8l. 
98. Id. at 82. "Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, 
will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing 
among members of the same sex, and conduct which a person in the plaintiff's position 
would find severely hostile and abusive." Id. 
99. See generally Jennifer J. Ator, Same Sex Harassment After Oncale v. Sun­
downer Offshore Services, Inc.: Overcoming the History of Judicial Discrimination in 
Light of the "Common Sense" Standard, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 583, 614-15 (1998) 
(predicting that the vague "common sense" standard set forth in Oncale will be abused 
by conservative courts). 
100. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988). In Price Waterhouse, 
a female employee was discriminated against because she was "macho," needed a 
"course in charm school," and should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. at 
235. The court held that discrimination based on gender stereotypes fell with the pro­
tection of Title VII because it was based on the victim's sex. Id. at 258. 
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a "term, condition or privilege of employment. "101 The Supreme 
Court case law illustrates a commitment to the purpose and objec­
tive of Title VII, which has forced the courts to expand the scope of 
the statute as society dictates. 
2. 	 Hostile Work Environment Resulting in a Constructive 
Discharge 
Under the doctrine of constructive discharge, the victim of an 
intolerably hostile work environment can resign and bring a claim 
for back pay.102 This doctrine is widely applied in Title VII 
cases,103 although it was initially created by the National Labor Re­
lations Board (NLRB).l04 In the 1930s the NLRB developed this 
form of compensation "to address situations in which employers co­
erced employees to resign, often by creating intolerable working 
conditions."105 Because the NLRB is concerned with the deliberate 
stifling of union organizations, constructive discharge victims are 
compensated only if the employer intended to force the employee's 
resignation.106 
In contrast to the NLRB approach, Title VII's focus is not on 
the subjective intention of the employer, but the effect of the 
harassing conduct on the employee.107 As a result, the majority of 
courts strayed from the NLRB approach108 in favor of a "reasona­
101. 28 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(l) (2000). 
102. Sarah H. Perry, Enough is Enough: Per Se Constructive Discharge for Vic­
tims of Sexually Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REV. 541, 
546-47 (1995) (noting that courts have allowed back pay under Title VII when an em­
ployee is constructively discharged); see Antonopoulos v. Zitnay, 360 F. Supp. 2d 420, 
429 (D. Conn. 2005) ("The United States Supreme Court recently concluded that hos­
tile work environment sexual harassment could, in certain circumstances, constitute a 
constructive discharge. "). 
103. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (permitting courts to award back pay upon a finding 
of intentional discrimination); see Cathy Shuck, Comment, That's It, I Quit: Returning 
to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
401, 410 (2002) (stating that originally, courts were hesitant to "recognize constructive 
discharges in Title VII cases"). 
104. See Sterling Corset Co., Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 858, 865 (1938) (discussing the con­
structive discharge standard). 
105. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004). 
106. Perry, supra note 102, at 547. Under the NLRB a constructive discharge 
victim must show the following: "(1) the burdens imposed upon the employee must 
cause, and be intended to cause, a change in working conditions so difficult or unpleas­
ant as to force the employee to resign; and (2) it must be shown that those burdens were 
imposed because of the employee's union activities." Id. 
107. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (making it unlawful to discriminate based on "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin"). 
108. The NLRB specific intent standard was used in early Title VII cases, and still 
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bleness" standard when analyzing Title VII constructive discharge 
claims.109 To prove a constructive discharge claim under Title VII, 
the victim must establish that the harassment was so unbearable 
that "a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt 
compelled to resign."llo By adopting the "reasonableness" stan­
dard, courts have shifted the focus from the employer to the em­
ployee,lll thereby forcing employers to eliminate all discriminatory 
conduct, even that which is not intended to prompt a resignation.112 
The "reasonableness" standard is not without its limits. A vic­
tim must establish that the harassment passed a "threshold level of 
intolerability"113 or involved aggravated factors beyond those pre­
sent in a traditional hostile work environment.114 This heightened 
standard is necessary to ensure that the constructive discharge is 
comparable to an actual discharge, ultimately forcing the employee 
to leave his/her job.115 Furthermore, courts have imposed upon the 
employee a duty to mitigate damages by requiring the employee to 
give notice of the intolerable conditions before resigning.116 Both 
is used in certain circumstances. The specific intent test for Title VII constructive dis­
charge claims was first established in Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th 
Cir. 1975) (holding that the employee must demonstrate that the employer's actions 
were intended to provoke a resignation), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); see Sheila 
Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 561, 566 (1986) (examining the history and standards of recovery for construc­
tive discharge claims). 
109. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have all adopted a form of the "reasonableness" standard. Shuck, supra note 103, at 
413. 
110. Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977). 
111. Shuck, supra note 103, at 404. 
112. Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting 
that the intent standard ignores the realities of the workplace). The adoption of the 
reasonableness standard is yet another example of the courts' commitment to the pur­
pose of Title VII. For example, the Supreme Court noted that compensation for Title 
VII violations should be guided by two principles: the eradication of discriminatory 
employment practices and the objective of making the victim whole. Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). The reasonableness standard allows more 
victims to receive compensation for their lost wages. 
113. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 445 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
114. See Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that something more than mere discrimination is required to fulfill a claim for 
constructive discharge). 
115. "The doctrine reflects the sensible judgment that employers charged with 
employment discrimination ought to be accountable for creating working conditions 
that are so intolerable to a reasonable employee as to compel that person to resign." 
Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999). 
116. Shuck, supra note 103, at 425; see Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. 
Supp. 1101, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that when an employee does not take advan­
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the "reasonableness" of the resignation and the duty to mitigate 
offer employers some protection against liability while encouraging 
the use of policies and procedures to combat harassment in the 
workplace. 
3. The Changing Face of Sexual Harassment 
Just as the framework of a hostile work environment claim has 
changed, the conduct that constitutes such an environment has gone 
through a metamorphosis of sorts. In traditional hostile work envi­
ronment cases, the conduct almost always occurred face-to-face or 
through some other direct interaction.117 This type of harassment 
includes, but is not limited to, sexual requests, offensive hand and 
body gestures,118 and sexually explicit language.119 Situations like 
these present an "easy case" for the plaintiff because the harass­
ment is so clearly subjectively and objectively offensive that it "ille­
gally poison[s]" the plaintiff's work environment, thereby violating 
Title VIJ.120 Courts, however, have not limited the definition of 
sexual harassment to face-to-face interactions. Once the Supreme 
Court established the "totality of the circumstances" test121 more 
and more conduct fell within the definition of harassment.122 
tage of the employer's harassment policies a constructive discharge claim cannot be 
sustained). 
117. The use of "traditional" in this instance is not meant to indicate "old" or 
"outdated." In fact, this blatant style of harassment is still prevalent today despite the 
protection of Title VII. See Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2004). 
In Petrosino, a female employee endured "frequent disparaging remarks" referencing 
her buttocks, breasts, menstrual cycle, weight, and eating habits. Id. 
118. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 
1992). The plaintiff in Kotcher had a viable Title VII claim when the defendant sub­
jected her to "repeated episodes of sexual harassment, manifested by vulgar comments 
and gestures." Id. These gestures included "pretend[ing] to masturbate and ejaculate at 
[the plaintiff] behind her back." Id. 
119. In Henson v. City of Dundee, for example, the harasser made "demeaning 
sexual inquiries and vulgarities" to the victim throughout a two-year period. 682 F.2d 
897,899 (11th Cir. 1982). In Bundy v. Jackson, the victim's supervisor requested her to 
visit his home to view obscene photos, and was once told "any man in his right mind 
would want to rape [her]." 641 F.2d 934, 940 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
120. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944 (citing Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, 454 U.S. 957 (1972». 
121. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (endorsing the 
"totality of the circumstances" test as promulgated by the EEOC Guidelines); see also 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993) (noting that "whether an environment 
is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances"). 
122. Although many courts used the "totality of the circumstances" test to ex­
pand the reach of Title VII, others used it to qualify certain conduct depending on the 
work environment. For example, conduct which is obviously offensive in an office set­
ting may not be so offensive in a mechanic shop or other blue-collar work environ­
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Courts have used the totality of the circumstances test to con­
clude that even if no single act of harassment satisfies the "severe 
and pervasive" requirement, an accumulation of lesser instances 
can satisfy the standard.123 In Williams v. General Motors Corp., 
the plaintiff claimed that she was sexually harassed, and offered fif­
teen descriptive examples of such conduct,124 including foul lan­
guage, offensive treatment by co-workers, workplace inequalities, 
and sexually related language.125 The Sixth Circuit held that the 
lower court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants 
because they "dis aggregated the plaintiff's claims ... which robbed 
the incidents of their cumulative effect. "126 The court noted, "the 
issue is not whether each incident ... standing alone is sufficient to 
sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, but 
whether-taken together- the reported incidents make out such a 
case."127 
The hostile work environment analysis has not stopped here. 
Included in the "totality" of an environment is the surrounding at­
mosphere, even though there may not be any direct harassment of 
the plaintiff by the defendant.128 For instance, in Robinson v. Jack­
ments. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the "totality of the circumstances" includes the type of work environment in which 
the harassing conduct occurs) (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 
(E.D. Mich. 1984». 
123. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 561-62 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the district court erred when it disaggregated the plaintiffs claims). 
124. Id. at 559. On a few occasions the plaintiff was called a "slut"; as she bent 
over a male co-worker stood behind her and said, "[b]ack up; just back up"; and she 
overheard a co-worker say, "I'm sick ... of these [f*ing] women." Id. 
125. Id. at 562. 
126. Id. at 561. But see Jeffery S. Lyons, Comment, Be Prepared: Unsuspecting 
Employers Are Vulnerable for Title VII Sexual Harassment Environment Claims, 37 
U.S.F. L. REV. 467, 487-88 (2003) (arguing that the Williams approach unjustly burdens 
employers because they have little or no chance of knowing about the smaller, yet per­
sistent, harassing conduct). 
127. Williams, 187 F.3d at 562; see Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. 
Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
[T]he analysis cannot carve the work environment into a series of discrete 
incidents and measure the harm adhering to each episode. Rather, a holistic 
perspective is necessary, keeping in mind that each successive episode has its 
predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and 
that the work environment created thereby may exceed the sum of the individ­
ual episodes. 
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524. 
128. See Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: 
Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 403, 410-15 (1991) (discussing the scope of the hostile work environment and its 
possible infringement upon First Amendment rights); see also Note, Sexual Harassment 
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sanville Shipyards, Inc., the plaintiff brought a claim for hostile 
work environment harassment based on pinups, offensive pictures, 
and calendars, all depicting female nudity in a degrading manner.129 
Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that she was harassed by offen­
sive language, although it was not always directed at her, including 
commentary and jokes.13° 
The court held that "[a] reasonable [woman] would find that 
the working environment at [Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.] was abu­
sive," considering the "sexual remarks, the sexual jokes, the sexu­
ally-orientated pictures of women, and the nonsexual rejection of 
women by coworkers."131 It has been argued that Title VII was not 
intended to transform the "social mores of American workers,"132 
but courts have nevertheless agreed that in order to eradicate dis­
criminatory conduct, the "pre-existing (meaning male dominating) 
atmosphere that deters women from entering or continuing in a 
profession" cannot be condoned.133 
As previously stated, in sexual harassment cases like Robinson, 
the plaintiff need not be physically touched or even suffer direct 
verbal abuse. Such blatant harassment is unnecessary because an 
environment riddled with pornography is so pervasive that it would 
affect the working conditions of even a reasonable woman. In 
cases, however, where the conduct is not open and pervasive, such 
as e-mail correspondence, the hostile nature of the conduct is not so 
evident.134 Courts thus far have not been willing to find that sexu­
ally explicit e-mails alone constitute a hostile work environment 
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1458 
(1984) (stating that without a clearly proscribed definition of what conduct is illegal, it is 
difficult to hold employers liable for conduct that was "not previously understood or 
intended to be wrongful"). 
129. 760 F. Supp. at 1495-98. 
130. Id. at 1498-99. Such commentary often occurred when the male employees 
made reference to the photographs on the walls. They included, "I'd like to have some 
of that," "That one there is mine" and numerous sexual jokes, one specifically referring 
to "sodomous rape." Id. 
131. Id. at 1524. 
132. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986), abro­
gated by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola 
Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). The Sixth Circuit adopted the 
district court's view that "[s]exual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may 
abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this." Id. 
133. Robinson, 760 F.Supp. at 1526. 
134. See Joan T.A. Gabel and Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution 
and Its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Work­
place, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 326-36 (2003) (discussing the increase in discriminatory and 
harassing conduct in the workplace due to cyberspace workplaces). 
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under Title VII,135 The hesitation by the courts to classify uncon­
ventional conduct as "hostile" exhibits their dedication to the 
framework already established: specifically, whether the conduct 
was objectively hostile and whether the conduct affected the 
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. "136 
C. Employer Liability 
1. The Basis for Employer Liability 
If a female employee asserts a claim under Title VII for sexual 
harassment, and she has proven that (1) she is a member of a pro­
tected group, (2) she "was subject to unwelcome sexual harass­
ment," (3) the harassment was based on her sex, and (4) the 
harassment "affected a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employ­
ment," she still has to prove (5) the existence of her employer's 
liability before she can recover.B7 Due to the Supreme Court's 
commitment to impose employer liability in accordance with the 
principles of agency law and the recent creation of employer affirm­
ative defenses,138 this may be the most difficult evidentiary require­
ment for victims to fulfill. 
Just as the elements of "quid pro quo" and hostile work envi­
ronment harassment are different, so too are the standards for em­
ployer liability in these two situations. For "quid pro quo" 
harassment, liability is an easy determination. If an employee suf­
fers "quid pro quo" harassment, he/she has suffered some form of 
tangible job detriment at the hands of a supervisor who has the 
power to alter the employee's job characteristics,139 Because the 
supervisor acts within the scope of his employment when firing, de­
moting, or transferring an employee for a discriminatory reason, 
that supervisor is an agent of the employer and "courts have con­
135. Id. at 332-33; see Schwenn v. Anheuser Busch, No. CIVA95CV716 (RSPI 
GJD), 1998 WL 166845, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. April 7, 1998) ( "The law does not make 
'actionable any conduct that is merely offensive."'). In Schwenn, the court held that e­
mails received by the plaintiff, although sexually offensive, were "very minor in com­
parison to those considered to create a hostile work environment." Id. The cases relied 
on in the Schwenn decision "included physical contact." Gabel, supra note 134, at 333. 
136. 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2 (2000). 
137. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). 
138. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
139. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that quid pro quo harassment requires evidence that "[the] submission to ... unwel­
come advances was an express or implied condition for receiving a job benefit or [that 
a] refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment" (citing Kauffman v. Allied 
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992))). 
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sistently held employers liable . . . whether or not the employer 
knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's ac­
tions. "140 In other words, an employer is vicariously liable to the 
victim for "quid pro quo" harassment.141 
A hostile work environment, on the other hand, can result 
from the actions of a supervisor or a co-worker acting within or 
outside the scope of employment, and the standard of liability, 
therefore, depends on the facts. When a co-worker creates a hostile 
work environment, the employer is only liable for its own negli­
gence, in that it knew or should have known about the harassment 
and failed to take proper action.142 The negligence standard of lia­
bility applies in cases of co-worker harassment because a co-worker 
has no actual or apparent authority and does not act within the 
scope of employment.143 The analysis becomes more difficult, how­
ever, when the harasser is a supervisor, because a supervisor, de­
pending upon the conduct, mayor may not be acting as an agent of 
the employer. 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the issue of 
employer liability in 1986 when it decided Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson. 144 Recognizing that Congress intended Title VII liability to 
reflect agency principles, the Court held that it is inappropriate to 
impose automatic vicarious liability on an employer for "acts of 
their supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular 
case."145 By rejecting automatic liability as a bright-line rule, the 
Court agreed with the EEOC that when a supervisor creates a hos­
tile work environment "the usual basis for a finding of agency will 
often disappear" because that agent is not acting within their scope 
140. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986). 
141. Vicarious liability in this instance stems from the Restatement Second of 
Agency. "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while 
acting within the scope of their employment. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 219(1) (1958). 
142. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505-06 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that an employer is only liable for co-worker harassment when the plaintiff proves that 
the employer has "been negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment" 
(quoting Parkins v. Civil Constrs. of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998) (inter­
nal quotations omitted))); see, e.g., Christopher Massaro, Note, The Role of Workplace 
Culture Evidence in Hostile Workplace Environment Sexual Harassment Litigation: 
Does Title VII Mean New Management or Just Business as Usual?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 349,357 (2002) (detailing the origins of employer liability). 
143. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. EUerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756-65 (1998) (using 
principles of agency to distinguish between co-worker and supervisor harassment for 
purposes of employer liability). 
144. 477 U.S. at 70. 
145. Id. at 72-73. 
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of employment.146 However, the Court did not fully embrace the 
knowledge or negligence standard because supervisors, by way of 
their position and power, are more culpable than standard 
employees.147 
The EEOC weighed in on the Meritor decision with regard to 
employer liability. The Guidelines of 1980 originally suggested that 
employers be held vicariously liable for all actions of their 
agents.148 However, in its amicus brief, the EEOC suggested to the 
Court that "[i]f the employer has an expressed policy against sexual 
harassment and had implemented a procedure specifically designed 
to resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take 
advantage of that procedure," the employer should not be automat­
ically liable.149 The court did not expressly accept or reject the 
EEOC's suggestion, noting that the existence of a grievance proce­
dure and policy are relevant, but not dispositive.150 Because Mer­
itor eluded any definitive conclusion as to the state of employer 
liability for hostile work environments created by supervisors, the 
issue remained in flux until the Supreme Court finally addressed it 
in 1998.151 
2. 	 Supreme Court Framework: Burlington Industries and 
Faragher 
The Supreme Court decided two cases in tandem, Burlington 
Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth 152 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,153 
both dealing with the issue of employer liability for supervisory har­
assment under a hostile work environment claim. In Ellerth, the 
146. Id. at 71-72. 
147. /d. at 72 (asserting that the "absence of notice to an employer does not nec­
essarily insulate that employer from liability" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958»). 
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985). 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) was repealed by the 
EEOC in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 	742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
149. Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26, Meritor Say. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). 
150. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
151. See Valerie H. Hunt, Case Note, Faragher v. Boca Raton: Employer Liability 
in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases-Ignorance Is No Longer Bliss, 52 
ARK. L. REv. 479,481-86 (1999) (discussing the different liability standards within the 
federal circuits prior to 1998). For example, the Third Circuit followed strict agency 
principles in Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 105-09 (3d Cir. 1994), while 
the Eighth Circuit rejected agency principles in favor of the "knowledge standard" in 
Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1997). Id. 
152. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
153. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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plaintiff brought a claim for "quid pro quo" harassment because on 
three occasions her supervisor threatened to deny her job benefits, 
although she never suffered a tangible job detriment.l54 The plain­
tiff also presented evidence of a hostile work environment in viola­
tion in the form of "boorish and offensive remarks and gestures" by 
her supervisor.155 The District Court held that the harassment was 
"severe and pervasive" but that Burlington had no knowledge of 
the harassment and, therefore, was not liable.l56 The Seventh Cir­
cuit reversed, and held Burlington vicariously liable for the acts of 
its supervisor.157 
Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the plaintiff estab­
lished that over a five-year period her supervisors had created a 
hostile work environment consisting of offensive touching, lewd re­
marks and language indicating that she would never be pro­
moted.158 The District court held the employer liable for the 
actions of its supervisors because (1) the harassment was severe and 
pervasive enough to infer knowledge or constructive knowledge on 
the part of the employer; (2) the supervisors were acting as agents 
of the employer; and (3) the supervisor was informed of the harass­
ment but did not act to correct it,159 On appeal, however, the Elev­
enth Circuit reversed and refused to impose vicarious liability 
because the supervisors were not acting as agents or aided by their 
agency relationship, and the employer "lacked constructive knowl­
edge of the supervisors' harassment."160 Because of the disparate 
results among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
settle the issue.161 
The Supreme Court established that whether or not an em­
ployer is liable for the acts of his employees depends, in large part, 
upon the principles of agency.162 Although a supervisor is an agent 
when acting within the scope of employment, a supervisor who ha­
154. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48 (describing the alleged harassment by the plain­
tiff's supervisor, including indirect threats regarding the plaintiff's job security). 
155. Id. at 747. 
156. Id. at 749 (citing Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1118­
23 (N.D. I\l. 1996». 
157. Id. at 749. 
158. 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). 
159. Id. at 783 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F.Supp. 1552,1562-64 
(S.D. Fla. 1994)). 
160. Id. at 785 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1166-67 (11th 
CiT. 1996». 
161. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 522 U.S. 1086 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 522 U.S. 978 (1997) 
162. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998). "In express 
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rasses a subordinate is not acting within that scope, and thus, is usu­
ally not an agent of the employer,163 Therefore, vicarious liability is 
not justified under the principles of agency law simply because the 
harasser is a supervisor, unless that supervisor caused the victim to 
suffer a tangible job detriment.164 
The Court's analysis did not stop there. Concluding that super­
visors are "aided-by-agency-relation" when they sexually harass 
employees, the Court refused to equate supervisory harassment 
with co-worker harassment for the purpose of employer liability,165 
Section 219 (2)( d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states 
that an employer "is not subject to liability for the torts of his [em­
ployees] acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: the 
[employee]. ..was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence 
of the agency relation. "166 The Court held, therefore, that because 
a supervisor might be aided by the position and power of the 
agency relationship when he/she sexually harasses an employee, vi­
carious liability is appropriate.167 
However, being bound by the decision in Meritor, which ex­
pressly refused to extend automatic employer liability to all super­
visory acts of harassment,168 the Supreme Court established an 
affirmative defense that an employer can assert to avoid liability 
when there has been no tangible employment action.169 If (1) the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the sex­
ually harassing behavior, and (2) the victim unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any of the procedures or policies instituted by the 
employer to address such situations, the employer will not be vicari­
ously liable for the sexually hostile environment created by its su­
terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency prin­
ciples." Id. at 754. 
163. Id. at 757; see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 794 (1998). 
164. When a supervisor fires, demotes, or transfers an employee for a discrimina­
tory purpose, that supervisor is acting within the scope of his employment. See RE· 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1958). "The scope of employment" 
includes conduct that the employee is "employed to perform" and that occurs "within 
authorized time and space." Id.; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793 (discussing agency princi­
ples in regard to employer liability). 
165. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802. 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §219(2)(d) (1958). 
167. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. "On the other hand, there are acts of harassment a 
supervisor might commit which might be the same as a co employee would commit 
...." Id. 
168. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 1 n.4. 
169. Id. at 807. 
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pervisorsPo By contrast, if the employer does not establish that it 
was "reasonably diligent in educating its employees and policing 
the workplace for instances of improper conduct," vicarious liability 
will be imposed.171 
3. Constructive Discharge as a Tangible Job Detriment 
After Ellerth and Faragher it was clear that an employer would 
not be automatically liable unless the supervisory harassment re­
sulted in a tangible job detriment, or the employer was unable to 
fulfill the affirmative defense. Therefore, in an effort to circumvent 
the difficult affirmative defense standard, some plaintiffs argued 
that a hostile work environment constructive discharge amounts to 
a tangible job detriment.172 The circuits split on the question 
whether a constructive discharge is comparable to an actual dis­
charge, thereby prompting vicarious liabilityP3 The Supreme 
Court addressed this issue in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.174 
Relying on the framework from Ellerth and Faragher, the Su­
preme Court began its analysis with the principles of agency law.175 
A constructive discharge, the Court held, is a tangible employment 
action if it results from "official act[s]" of the supervisor or the em­
ployer.176 The Court reasoned that a supervisor who sexually ha­
rasses an employee through official acts is acting as an agent of the 
employer and automatic liability, therefore, is appropriate. l77 In 
contrast, when the constructive discharge does not result from "offi­
cial act[s]" of the supervisor, the employer has no reason to be put 
on notice and should be allowed to assert the affirmative 
defense.178 
170. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
171. Lyons, supra note 126, at 476. 
172. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (addressing the plain­
tiffs claim that she suffered a tangible job detriment because she was constructively 
discharged). 
173. Compare Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 
2002) (holding that a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action) with 
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that a constructive discharge is not a tangible job action). 
174. 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
175. Id. at 143 ("Our starting point is the framework of Ellerth and Faragher to 
govern employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors."). 
176. Id. at 147. 
177. Id. at 148 ("[O]fficial directions and declarations are the acts most likely to 
be brought home to the employer, the measures over which the employer can exercise 
greatest control. "). 
178. Id. ("Absent 'an official act of the enterprise,' as the last straw, the employer 
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Following Suders, the lower courts were left to decide which 
acts of a supervisor are inherently "official" and which are "unoffi­
cial." Like so many other Title VII standards (severe and perva­
sive, totality of the circumstances, reasonable resignation, etc.), the 
line between official and unofficial appears to depend upon the 
facts of individual cases. Due to the recent nature of the Suders 
decision, the interpretation of the "official acts" standard in the 
lower courts is unclear. Early interpretations, however, suggest that 
"official acts" are those that have a tangible employment conse­
quence, such as a demotion or pay decrease.179 It appears, there­
fore, that if a constructive discharge results from quid-pro-quo 
harassment, an employer will be vicariously liable, but if the con­
structive discharge results from hostile work environment harass­
ment, an employer will be afforded the opportunity to assert the 
affirmative defense.18o 
II. ANALYSIS 
The foregoing discussion of the Title VII framework makes 
clear that, in developing the statutory structure, the courts did not 
consider plaintiffs like the hypothetical Janet Johnson. The courts 
have focused on more overt forms of harassment, as evidenced by 
the objective and subjective standards and the affirmative defense 
requiring victims to give notice. Despite the established structure, 
though, the fact that a victim of video voyeurism does not suffer a 
hostile environment until discovering the "peeping" does not make 
the effect of the harassment any less damaging, or the need to com­
pensate victims any less pressing. 
This analysis, therefore, will demonstrate that when a supervi­
sor is guilty of video voyeurism, the victim suffers a hostile work 
environment for which the employer is liable. Employer liability is 
ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a resignation is not the typi­
cal kind daily occurring in the work force. "). 
179. See Wade v. Minyards Food Stores, No. 3:03-CV-1403-B, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4973, at *23-26 (N.D. Tex. March 25, 2005) (equating an "official act" with a 
"tangible employment action" such as "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with different andlor less desirable responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits"); see also Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No. 03-35906, 2005 
U.S. App. LEXIS 23551, at *16 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2005) (stating that sexually harassing 
remarks by a supervisor are "insufficient" to constitute an "official act" as defined in 
Suders). 
180. See Wade, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *26 (citing Reed v. MBNA Marketing 
Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003) (asserting that when "a supervisor, in retal­
iation for spurned advances, assigns the victimized employee to an extremely dangerous 
job assignment," such an action constitutes an official act). 
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proper because the perpetrator is a supervisor, and employers are 
vicariously liable for the acts of their supervisors. Moreover, an 
employer cannot shield itself from liability by asserting the affirma­
tive defense in a video voyeurism case because it cannot fulfill the 
second prong of the defense, namely, that the employee unreasona­
bly failed to avail himself or herself of the employer's sexual harass­
ment remedial procedures. 
Employer liability does not end the discussion, however, and 
this analysis concludes by offering a solution that would ease the 
burden on employers. The solution consists of a mitigated damages 
analysis that would decrease an employer's liability if it acted rea­
sonably and effectively to eradicate the harassment. This approach 
would offer victims compensation while still encouraging employers 
to eliminate harassing behavior, thereby effectuating Title VII's 
dual goal of deterrence and compensation. 
A. 	 The Johnson Hypothetical and Title VI/'s Hostile Work 
Environment 
1. "Peeping" as Discriminatory Sexual Harassment 
Janet Johnson's hypothetical sexual harassment claim falls 
within the purview of discrimination based on sex as required by 
Title VII. Sexual discrimination under Title VII occurs when vic­
tims are subject to unwelcome conduct precisely because of their 
sex.181 As then-Justice Rehnquist noted in Meritor, when harass­
ment occurs because of the victim's sex, that harassment is discrimi­
natory in nature.182 The Supreme Court has endorsed a "but for" 
test when analyzing whether harassing conduct is based on sex.183 
In Johnson's case, "but for" her womanhood she would not have 
been the target of secret surveillance.184 The harassment was not 
181. 	 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
182. 	 Id. 
183. American Law Institute, Current Developments In Employment Law, SK013 
ALI-ABA 569, 589 (2004) ("The Supreme Court has emphasized the 'but for' pleading 
requirement for harassment claims ...."); see, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting that Title VII is directed at discrimination 
"because of" sex). 
184. See Nicolle R. Lipper, Comment: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A 
Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United States, 13 COMPo LAB. L. 293, 306 
(1992) (noting that "but for [the plaintiffs] womanhood, her participation in sexual 
activity would never have been solicited"). The "but for" test was first articulated in 
Barnes V. Castle, where the court stated that "[b]ut for [the victim's] womanhood, her 
participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited." 561 F.2d 983, 990 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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only sexual in nature but also discriminatory because the perpetra­
tor would not have acted similarly towards a male employee. There­
fore, the surveillance constitutes discriminatory harassment. 
Undeniably, "peeping," and more specifically video voyeurism, 
is not the type of sexual harassment that Congress sought to ad­
dress by passing Title VII. But it is also unlikely that the legislature 
contemplated same-sex harassment,185 sexual orientation harass­
ment,186 or harassment based on gender stereotyping,187 yet each 
has received Title VII protection. Discussing same-sex harassment, 
Justice Scalia observed: 
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assur­
edly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ulti­
mately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal con­
cerns of our legislators by which we are governed .... [Title VII] 
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the stat­
utory requirements.188 
Janet Johnson meets the statutory requirements of Title VII. 
She was discriminatorily harassed because of her "sex," and that 
harassment affected the "terms, conditions, [and] privileges of [her] 
employment."189 
2. 	 Severity and Subjectivity: The Meritor and Harris 
Hurdles 
Not all sexually harassing conduct creates a hostile work envi­
ronment. The harassment must be "sufficiently severe or perva­
sive"190 and "subjectively" and "objectively"191 hostile to be 
actionable under Title VII. The sexual invasion that victims of 
video voyeurism suffer is undoubtedly "severe"192 enough to alter 
185. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
186. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. 
Or. 2002) (noting that the plaintiff was harassed because she dated other women and 
therefore did not conform to her supervisor's notion of how a woman should behave). 
187. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); see Nichols v. Azteca 
Restaurant Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the plaintiff's 
allegation that "he was verbally harassed by some male co-workers and a supervisor 
because he was effeminate and did not meet their views of a male stereotype. "). 
188. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80. 
189. 42 U.S.c. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
190. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
191. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
192. The Second Circuit interprets the "severe or pervasive" standard to mean 
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employment conditions, rendering them unable to fulfill their job 
duties, and eventually compelling them to resign. The exact 
timeframe, or "pervasiveness," of the secret surveillance is un­
known, but even a single episode of sexual harassment this detri­
mental and humiliating violates Title VII.193 The" 'frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct' is only one factor in the [Meritor] analy­
sis,"194 and whether it was continuous or an isolated event, "peep­
ing" is sufficiently "severe" when compared with other hostile work 
environments. 
The Seventh Circuit, for instance, held that a plaintiff suffered 
"severe" sexual harassment when her boss propositioned her for 
oral sex, a threesome, and phone sex within the context of one con­
versation.195 In the Second Circuit, a plaintiff who was obscenely 
berated in front of other employees concerning her menstrual cycle 
and her inability to perform oral sex adequately experienced "se­
vere" harassment to constitute a hostile work environment,196 The 
common characteristic between these examples and the harassment 
in the Johnson hypothetical is the humiliating and degrading effect 
that a single event can create. If a victim is repeatedly "peeped," it 
accentuates the argument by making the harassment "severe" and 
"pervasive," but such a fact is not necessary for the claim to 
continue. 
The harassing conduct, however, must be both objectively and 
subjectively hostile for the hostile environment claim to con­
tinue.197 This is the first major obstacle that victims of video 
voyeurism face within the current Title VII framework. According 
to Harris, conduct must be objectively hostile in that a reasonable 
person would find it abusive, and the victim must "subjectively per-
that "the plaintiff must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily 
severe, or that a series of incidents were 'sufficiently continuous and concerted' to have 
altered the conditions of her working environment." Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 
F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
193. Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n 
isolated incident may suffice if the conduct is severe and threatening."). 
194. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2001) (cit­
ing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 
195. Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 902, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing summary judgment for the defendant employer because a reasonable jury 
could find that the plaintiff was subjected to severe sexual harassment). 
196. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing 
summary judgment for the defendant employer because a rational juror could find the 
event humiliating). 
197. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
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ceive the environment to be abusive," or no Title VII violation ex­
istS.198 Objectively, any rational person would perceive the act of 
being secretly watched or taped in areas of extreme privacy as hos­
tile and abusive. Subjectively, however, a victim of video voyeur­
ism does not perceive the harassing conduct, unlike a victim of 
verbal abuse or a physical assault. That is not to say that victims do 
not perceive a hostile work environment upon discovering the 
"peeping," but that they do not perceive it contemporaneous to the 
harassment. 
A Florida court had the opportunity to address this issue in a 
suit following the Walt Disney World "peeping" scandal described 
in the Introduction. In Liberti v. Walt Disney World Co., the plain­
tiffs were videotaped through peepholes in their dressing room.199 
Disney claimed that the actual "peeping" did not create a hostile 
work environment because the plaintiffs were unaware of the har­
assment while it was occurring.20o The court denied Disney's mo­
tion for summary judgment, however, stating that it was "unwilling 
to find ... that [the perpetrator's] alleged conduct had no impact on 
either an objective or subjective interpretation of a hostile work en­
vironment, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' lack of knowledge at the 
time of [the perpetrator's] peeping."201 Disney's defense failed be­
cause it relied on cases where the plaintiffs did not perceive the 
harassment or become aware of the harassing conduct until they 
were no longer employed with the defendant company.202 
Like the Disney plaintiffs, Janet Johnson learned about the 
"peeping" while she was still an employee. Her awareness trig­
ogered the hostile environment, making Johnson so self-conscious 
and suspicious that she could no longer fulfill her job responsibili­
ties. Because video voyeurism is not on point with other, more di­
rect forms of sexual harassment, the Harris test must be expanded 
to include subjectively hostile environments that occur after the 
harassment has ceased. The alternative would unjustly deny victims 
compensation, not because workplace "peeping" or video voyeur­
198. Id. at 21-22. 
199. 912 F. Supp. 1494, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1995). 
200. Id. at 1504. Disney argued that "because [the perpetrator] had been termi­
nated and arrested before any of the plaintiffs was [sic] aware of his activities, [the 
perpetrator's] conduct could not have contributed to the allegedly hostile work environ­
ment." Id. 
201. Id. at 1505. 
202. Id. at 1504; see Edwards v. Wallace Community Coli, 49 F.3d 1517, 1522 
(11th Cir. 1995). 
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ism does not constitute harassment, but merely because it is a dif­
ferent form of harassment. 
A similar rationale has taken root in racial discrimination cases 
involving indirect harassment.203 In these cases, courts have held 
that racially-hostile comments about which the plaintiff has no per­
sonal knowledge, but of which the plaintiff later becomes aware204 
are sufficient to create a hostile work environment when viewed in 
light of the "totality of the circumstances.''205 Essentially, courts 
have concluded that the Harris standard requires subjective knowl­
edge about the harassment, but not necessarily subjective observa­
tion at the time it occurS.206 Janet Johnson's hostile work 
environment claim is fundamentally the same as those in the racial 
discrimination cases. Johnson, therefore, should be allowed to re­
cover under Title VII since her knowledge of the harassment 
caused her to subjectively perceive a hostile or abusive environ­
ment, even if she did not subjectively perceive the harassing 
conduct. 
B. 	 Constructive Discharge: The Reasonableness of Johnson's 
Resignation 
Johnson's resignation was reasonable207 under the theory of 
constructive discharge because the hostile work environment cre­
ated by her supervisor was "aggravated" compared to average hos­
tile work environments.208 Victims of video voyeurism suffer from 
203. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that 
the district court erred when it discounted racial slurs that were said outside of the 
plaintiff's presence); see also Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 
673 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a hostile environment is created even when comments 
are not directed at the plaintiff). 
204. 	 Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 11I. 
205. 	 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
206. Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 111 ("The mere fact that Schwapp was not present 
when a racially derogatory comment was made will not render that comment irrelevant 
to his hostile work environment claim. "). 
207. Although there are two tests for constructive discharge, "reasonableness" 
and "specific intent," this analysis will only address the "reasonableness" test since this 
test has been adopted by the majority of circuits. See supra, note 109. In addition, the 
Supreme Court recently endorsed the "reasonableness" test in Pa. State Police v. Sud­
ers, stating that the test for constructive discharge is "objective: Did working conditions 
become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have 
felt compelled to resign?" 542 U.S. 129,141 (2004). This Note makes no argument that 
a plaintiff such as Janet Johnson would prevail under the "specific intent" test. See 
supra note 108. 
208. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods, 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that constructive discharge claims "must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasive­
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feelings of invasion, humiliation, and extreme self-consciousness, 
which together create an intolerably hostile work environment. A 
typical hostile work environment, the Supreme Court has stated, is 
created "before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous break­
down" and can be sufficiently severe even if the harassment "does 
not seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being."209 
Thus, when a hostile environment does result in severe emotional 
distress, as in the case of video voyeurism, the harassing conduct 
clearly involves the requisite "aggravated" or "intolerable" condi­
tions to justify a constructive discharge.21o 
Victims of video voyeurism are emotionally traumatized, even 
characterizing the experience as "visual rape. "211 Long after the 
"peeping" has stopped, some victims still survey every room they 
enter, shy away from video cameras, and are burdened by a con­
stant feeling that someone is watching them.212 The hostile envi­
ronments experienced by even the most reasonable victims of video 
voyeurism are "more than ordinary,"213 as compared to, for in­
stance, the workplace in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards Inc.214 
In Robinson, the court held that a hostile work environment was 
created by pervasive pictures of nude women and the frequent shar­
ing of sexual jokes between the male employees.215 While the har­
assment in Robinson was clearly abusive and severe, the 
harassment suffered by victims of "peeping" is more direct, inti­
mate, and emotionally damaging. "Peeping" victims are not just 
exposed to hostile environments, or forced to overhear sexually ex­
plicit conversations, but instead, they are the exact targets of the 
abuse with, literally, all eyes on them. 
In light of the invasive and humiliating nature of video voyeur­
ism, it is clear that a victim in Janet Johnson's situation would feel 
ness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environ· 
ment"}; see also Shuck, supra note 103, at 424 (noting that "aggravated circumstance" is 
a question of fact judged on a case-by-case basis). 
209. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (noting how a hostile environment can affect work 
performance without being detrimental to the victim's health). 
210. See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing how a "finding of constructive discharge would be supported by the fact that 
plaintiff had a breakdown"). 
211. Katie Mulvaney, Creeps with Tiny Camera Take Snooping to a New Low, 
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN (R.I.), April 20, 2003, at A-lO. 
212. Id. 
213. Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998}(stating 
that under "ordinary" conditions the employee is expected to stay on the job). 
214. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
215. Id. at 1524-25. 
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compelled to resign. Johnson had become preoccupied and self­
conscious at work, and therefore, was unable to fulfill her job re­
sponsibilities. As a direct result of the "peeping," Johnson found it 
difficult even to remain in the office. Under these "aggravated con­
ditions," where an employee's emotional stability is at issue, a resig­
nation would be tantamount to a termination because there is no 
choice but to quit.216 
Lastly, the secret character of video voyeurism leaves victims 
with no opportunity to mitigate their damages by giving notice to 
the employer, as is typically required in the case of a constructive 
discharge.217 As a result, the mitigation requirement should not 
preclude a constructive discharge claim for plaintiffs like Johnson 
unless it can be proven that the victim had knowledge of the "peep­
ing." Victims of video voyeurism in the workplace should be 
awarded their lost wages21S because they are subjected to "aggra­
vated factors" that would compel a reasonable person to resign and, 
ultimately, it is the intolerability of the workplace, not the duty to 
give notice, that is at the heart of the constructive discharge 
doctrine. 
C. Employer Liability: Favoring the Victim in Choices of Equity 
Although video voyeurism victims such as Janet Johnson can 
establish valid Title VII claims, they will only be compensated for 
lost wages unless there is justification for holding the employer lia­
ble for compensatory damages. As explained in Part II. D, John­
son's employer is vicariously liable for the harassing conduct of its 
supervisor because the supervisor is an agent of the employer.219 
Vicarious liability is not automatic, however, and an employer can 
assert the two-part affirmative defense to avoid liability.220 If the 
employer can establish that (1) it "exercised reasonable care to pre­
vent and correct promptly" the harassment, and (2) the victim "un­
reasonably failed to take advantage of the corrective opportunities 
offered by the employer" or otherwise avoid harm,221 then the em­
216. Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232 (D. Kan. 1998). 
217. Shuck, supra note 103, at 425. 
218. Title VII allows courts to award back pay if the discrimination is intentional. 
42 U.S.c. 2000e-5(g) (2000). But courts have only awarded back pay in situations where 
the plaintiff was fired or constructively discharged. See Shuck, supra note 103, at 403 
n.7. 
219. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762-63 (1998). 
220. Id. at 765. 
221. Id. 
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ployer will escape liability. Assuming that Johnson's employer 
meets the first prong of the test, it may argue that Johnson did not 
give notice of the harassment or seek to use the corrective pro­
grams in place. But can it be said that Johnson's failure to act was 
unreasonable considering her lack of knowledge? 
1. 	 On Its Face, the Affirmative Defense Is Inappropriate in 
Covert "Peeping" Cases. 
Janet Johnson's hypothetical situation poses a unique problem 
for employers seeking to assert the affirmative defense. Johnson's 
employer fulfilled its duty to prevent the harassment by instituting 
policies and procedures, and acted swiftly to correct the problem by 
firing the perpetrator. But, according to the wording of the de­
fense, the employer should be held liable because Johnson acted 
reasonably as well. Any other result would be counterintuitive be­
cause Johnson was virtually unaware of the harassment until the 
employer remedied the situation. 
Video voyeurism, in light of its secretive nature, exposes the 
problems with the current Title VII framework which is structured 
around only the most obvious forms of harassment. For example, 
the affirmative defense focuses not only on the employer but seeks 
to encourage victims to take appropriate steps to avoid or minimize 
the harm.222 But when the harassment is virtually undetectable and 
unanticipated,223 as with video voyeurism, this goal of mitigation is 
unachievable. 
In cases where the second prong of the affirmative defense is 
not met because the employee acted reasonably, some courts have 
simply focused on the first prong in an attempt to avoid imposing 
"automatic" liability on employers.224 This interpretation is flawed 
and ignores the plain requirements of the defense. While it is true 
that the defense was implemented by the Supreme Court to limit 
employer liability,225 the Court explicitly gave the victim partial 
control over the issue of liability to increase the likelihood that em­
222. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). 
223. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999). 
224. See McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) 
("[W]e hold [the defendant] is entitled to a modified EllerthiFaragher affirmative de­
fense, despite [defendant's] inability to prove the second element."). 
225. Todd, 175 F.3d at 598 ("The Supreme Court's new affirmative defense was 
adopted to avoid 'automatic' employer liability and to give credit to employers who 
make reasonable efforts to prevent and remedy sexual harassment." (citing Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998))). 
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ployees would report sexual harassment.226 The Supreme Court ex­
pressed its view that "[i]f the victim could have avoided harm, no 
liability should be found against the employer which had taken rea­
sonable care" to prevent and correct the harassment.227 Or, in the 
alternative, if the victim could not have avoided harm, then even a 
reasonable employer would be liable. Viewing the affirmative de­
fense as requiring both the reasonableness of the employer and the 
unreasonableness of the employee, victims of video voyeurism are 
entitled to compensatory damages under Title VII. 
2. 	 Employers Should be Vicariously Liable When Victims 
Lack Knowledge or Opportunity to Cure 
Harassment. 
a. 	 Two Views of Employer Liability 
On two occasions the Eighth Circuit has discussed whether an 
employer will be protected by the affirmative defense when the em­
ployee lacked the ability to give notice of the harassment. In Todd 
v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. 228 and McCurdy v. Arkansas State Poiice,229 
the courts questioned the applicability of the affirmative defense to 
cases of "single incident harassment" that create hostile work envi­
ronments.230 Single incident harassment and the video voyeurism 
that Johnson suffered share the same unique quality: the victim is 
unable to remedy the situation until the hostile work environment 
has already arisen. The conflicting analyses from Todd and Mc­
Curdy, therefore, illustrate the dilemma that courts will face in de­
ciding whether to hold employers liable for workplace "peeping." 
The Todd court refrained from applying the affirmative de­
fense because in situations of "single, severe, unanticipatable" har­
assment, the victim is unable to avoid the harm.231 In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Arnold argued that the "affirmative de­
fense ... is not always a complete defense to liability" and "should 
[not] always erase the tort completely."232 In McCurdy, however, 
226. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. 
227. Id. at 807. 
228. 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1999). 
229. 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004). 
230. Todd, 175 F.3d at 598. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 599 (Arnold, J., concurring); see Rachel Shachter, Creating Equitable 
Outcomes Through Remedies: When Reasonable Employers Must Be Held Liable for 
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 567 (2001) (noting that 
courts should follow the literal interpretation of the affirmative defense even in cases 
where employers acted reasonably). 
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the court rejected Todd, favoring the protection of employers who 
take the necessary precautionary and remedial steps.233 With this 
conclusion, the McCurdy court admittedly created a "modified El­
lerth/Faragher affirmative defense" that omits any analysis of 
whether the victim acted reasonably.234 The majority in McCurdy 
justified this amended defense by relying on courts' adherence to 
agency principles. The court stated that when the employer acts 
reasonably and the supervisor had no authority to sexually harass 
the victim, agency law prevents the imposition of strict liability.235 
Removing the second prong of the defense, as the McCurdy 
court did, is "as neat an illusion as any sleight-of-hand artist ever 
created with a real coin."236 The illusion is that the Supreme 
Court's Ellerth/Faragher defense can be restricted to the facts of 
those cases, namely, long-lasting and pervasive harassment.237 
There is no language in either Supreme Court decision limiting the 
affirmative defense to certain types of sexually hostile environ­
ments to prevent automatic employer liability.238 In fact, avoiding 
automatic liability is admittedly not the Supreme Court's only con­
cern in Title VII cases.239 
b. Deterrence and Compensation 
Title VII requires courts to consider not only principles of 
agency, but also the preventative240 and compensatory241 aspects 
233. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772 (stating that denying an employer the protection 
of the affirmative defense essentially imposes strict liability). 
234. Id. at 772. 
235. Id. at 773 ("[W]e ... could not faithfully follow Supreme Court precedent if 
we held the [employer] strictly liable ...."). 
236. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wie­
ner, J., concurring) [hereinafter Indest II]. 
237. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) [herein­
after Indest I] (stating that the EllerthiFaragher decision does not speak to the specific 
instance where both employee and employer act reasonably). 
238. McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 775 (Melloy, J., dissenting) ("I cannot read anything in 
EllerthiFaragher that creates an exception to the two prong affirmative defense for 
those cases of single incident harassment that do rise to the level of actionable sexual 
harassment."); see Indest II, 168 F.3d at 798 (illustrating how the "Ellerth and Faragher 
opinions ... unmistakably address[ ] ... the entire spectrum of an employer's vicarious 
liability under TItle VII"); Shachter, supra note 232, at 583 (arguing that the "affirma­
tive defense reads more like a universal code than malleable, content-specific common­
law"). 
239. Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) ("Although Mer­
itor suggested the limitation on employer liability stemmed from agency principles, the 
Court acknowledged other considerations might be relevant as well. "). 
240. Id. at 764 (adopting the affirmative defense "[i]n order to accommodate ... 
Title VII's ... basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action 
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that the Civil Rights Act was intended to promote. If courts refuse 
to impose liability on certain employers the deterrent effect would 
be stifled because employers would not be expected to actively 
combat covert types of harassment such as video voyeurism. Such a 
result would be contrary to Congress's intent that Title VII be a 
"'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and to self­
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, 
so far as possible, the last vestiges' of discrimination."242 Without 
the fear of liability, employers would have little motivation to en­
sure that the workplace is free of illegal video surveillance or to 
better monitor the use of legitimate office video equipment. Be­
cause video "peeping" creates a hostile work environment from the 
moment of inception, the only adequate means of fulfilling Title 
VII's vision is absolute prevention, and absolute prevention cannot 
be achieved if the only measure of an employer's liability is reason­
ableness after-the-fact.243 
For victims like Janet Johnson, Title VII's "make whole" provi­
sion244 would be irrelevant if employer liability depended solely on 
the first prong of the affirmative defense. The question of liability 
would focus exclusively on the employer's rights, disregarding the 
substantial and unavoidable loss suffered by the victim. Even if a 
victim of video voyeurism proves that he or she suffered severe sex-
by objecting employees"); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) 
(noting Title VII's "primary objective" to "avoid harm"). 
241. Albemarle Paper Co., v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975) (affirming a Title 
VII purpose "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful em­
ployment discrimination"). 
242. Shachter, supra note 232, at 593 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (citations omitted». 
243. This view is supported by the EEOC: 
[I]f a supervisor's misconduct causes immediate harm and the employee 
promptly complains, 'corrective action by the employer could prevent further 
harm but might not correct the actionable harm that the employee already had 
suffered .... In these circumstances, the employer will be liable because the 
defense requires proof that it exercised reasonable legal care and that the em­
ployee unreasonably failed to avoid the harm.' 
John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability: The 
Emergence ofa Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Super­
visory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 Hous. L. 
REV. 1401, 1427 (2002) (citing EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EM­
PLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, at note 7 and ac­
companying text (June 21, 1999) (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
harassment.html) [hereinafter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]). 
244. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418; see Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 172 
(3d Cir. 1995) (noting that Title VII's make-whole purpose is further illustrated by Con­
gress's broad grant of authority to the courts regarding equitable remedies). 
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ual harassment and that he or she acted reasonably under the cir­
cumstances, that victim would not be "restor[ ed] ... to the position 
that [he or] she would have likely enjoyed had it not been for the 
[harassment]. "245 Such an outcome begs the question: In situations 
where both parties act reasonably, why should the victim suffer the 
loss when the employer has a greater ability to control and combat 
harassment like video voyeurism?246 
Proponents of a single-prong defense clearly side with the em­
ployer, claiming that compensation is a secondary concern in Title 
VII cases. Although compensation may not be the primary objec­
tive, it is an important objective, as evinced by the 1991 amend­
ments to the Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1991247 was 
enacted by Congress to better compensate victims that previously 
received only equitable remedies such as injunctive or declaratory 
relief and reinstatement.248 After 1991, victims of employment dis­
crimination were able to claim compensatory damages for "future 
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental 
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary 
losses"249 as well as punitive damages if the employer acted with 
"malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected 
rights."25o Arguably, the addition of punitive damages would have 
been sufficient to increase deterrence, but Congress also intended 
to "ensure compensation commensurate with the harms suffered by 
victims of intentional discrirnination"251 by including compensatory 
damages. Therefore, any judicial action that fails to compensate a 
victim who fulfills the Title VII requirements, such as Janet John­
son, disregards the intent of Congress. 
To accomplish Title VII's dual objective of prevention and 
compensation, the Todd approach to employer liability should pre­
245. Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 967 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fitzger­
ald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980». 
246. See Michael C Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VIJ: 
A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 48 (1999) 
(stating that the when both parties act reasonably, the clear language of the Ellerthl 
Faragher defense places the burden on the employer). 
247. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C 
and 2 U.S.C). 
248. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g) (2000); see Mitchell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 883 F.2d 
451,452 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that Title VII victims are not entitled to compensatory 
damages). 
249. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) 
(1992». 
250. Id. 
251. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 18 (1991). 
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vail. The McCurdy decision and others like it252 ignore the unique 
characteristics of Title VII and the delicate balance between agency 
and equity that is required to fulfill its goals. Understanding the 
intricacies of Title VII, the Meritor Court recognized that "com­
mon-law [agency] principles may not be transferable in all their par­
ticulars to Title VII. "253 
c. Stare Decisis 
Some courts continue to insist that agency law is paramount 
and argue that imposing automatic liability on employers in any Ti­
tle VII case violates Meritor and offends the doctrine of stare deci­
sis. These courts interpret Meritor as rejecting automatic liability 
for employers in all cases of supervisory harassment that do not 
result in a tangible job detrimenP54 This is an overly broad reading 
of Meritor, especially in light of the Supreme Court's Ellerthl 
Faragher decisions requiring vicarious employer liability for super­
visory harassment.255 What Meritor expressly held was that it is in­
appropriate to impose automatic liability upon an employer for all 
acts of its supervisor, irrespective of the circumstances .256 
It is the more narrow reading of Meritor that allowed the Su­
preme Court to endorse vicarious liability for supervisory harass­
ment unless the employer can fulfill the affirmative defense.257 The 
EllerthlFaragher defense is the Court's attempt to consider the sur­
rounding circumstances before imposing liability on the employer. 
252. See Coates v. Sundor Brands Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (con­
cluding that "a prompt response ... to halt [the] harassment is sufficient to relieve the 
employer of liability"); Yerry v. Pizza Hut, 186 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(holding that the employer is entitled to prevail if either "(a) the plaintiff did not avail 
himself of these preventative or corrective opportunities; or (b) the employee com­
plained and the employer responded by acting soon thereafter to appropriately correct 
the action or behavior") (emphasis added). 
253. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
254. See McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 726, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that denying an employer the affirmative defense creates strict liability contrary 
to the holding in Meritor); Indest I, 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) (claiming that 
automatic or vicarious liability would "undermine" Meritor). 
255. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an 
employer is subject to vicarious liability for acts of its supervisors). 
256. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. "[W]e hold that the Court of Appeals erred in con­
cluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their 
supervisors." Id. at 72. 
257. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 ("[W]e are bound by our holding in Meritor that 
agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory 
harassment."). It is important to note that the Supreme Court interprets Meritor and 
the principles of agency as a constraint on liability, not an outright barrier to it. 
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Under the circumstances as presented in the Johnson hypothetical, 
an employer cannot fulfill both prongs of the affirmative defense, 
and vicarious liability is not only appropriate, but necessary to ef­
fectuate the express holding of the Supreme Court. 
The courts that have refused to apply both prongs of the af­
firmative defense argue that it is the Supreme Court that should 
declare employers strictly liable when both parties act reasona­
bly.258 Yet these same courts, which defer to the Supreme Court as 
the proper authority on the matter of liability, have little difficulty 
disregarding the holdings in Ellerth and Faragher.259 This is the es­
sence of judicial picking and choosing.260 The Supreme Court did 
not disregard Meritor when it decided Ellerth and Faragher. In fact, 
with Meritor as a starting point, the Court incorporated the princi­
ples of agency into the affirmative defense to the greatest extent 
possible without abandoning their obligation to Congress and the 
purposes of Title VII.261 Stare decisis, therefore, is a thin premise 
for lower courts to rest upon as they disregard the express language 
of the affirmative defense in favor of a modified standard that pro­
tects employers. 
D. 	 Suggested Solution: Vicarious Liability with a Twist of 
Compromise 
An employer's reasonable efforts to prevent and promptly 
eliminate video voyeurism in the workplace should not be a com­
plete shield from liability. Because the damage from supervisory 
"peeping" cannot be undone, "the employer should be forced to 
258. See McCurdy, 375 F.3d at 772 ("To hold the [employer] liable for [the super­
visor's] unauthorized acts would be to expand the scope of strict liability under Title 
VII. Expanding strict liability principles is better left to the Supreme Court ...."). 
259. See id. at 771 ("Strict adherence to the Supreme Court's two-prong affirma­
tive defense in this case is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. We will not 
tire ourselves with such an exercise."). 
260. As stated previously, some courts have disregarded the second prong of the 
two-prong EllerthlFaragher defense in favor of employers. See supra note 224. Still 
others have developed an alternative negligence standard considering the" 'critical is­
sue' to be whether the [employer] knew of the supervisor's 'proclivity to commit the 
sexual assault, and if so, whether they took reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff 
[employee] from him.'" Shachter, supra note 232, at 580 (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Whitaker v. Mercer County, 65 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (D.N.J. 1999». 
261. Harper, supra note 246, at 50. The majority in Ellerth and Faragher "looked 
to the purposes, structure, and compromises of Title VII, as well as the guidelines ex­
pressed in Meritor, to limit responsibly the exercise of a law-making power delegated by 
Congress through the use of the general agency term in Title VII's definition of em­
ployer." Id. 
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bear the costs"262 of the harassment when the victim acts reasona­
bly. Alternatively, the employer's reasonable actions cannot be dis­
counted simply because harassment damages" [are] one of the costs 
of doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather than the 
victim."263 Such an approach would stifle the employer's motiva­
tion to actively prevent or rectify the harassment, thereby under­
mining Title VII's deterrent purpose. Instead, when both parties 
act reasonably, the employer's commendable behavior should serve 
to mitigate its damages.264 
Both the EEOC and the Supreme Court recognize that "[i]n 
some cases, an employer will be unable to avoid liability com­
pletely, but may be able to establish the affirmative defense as a 
means to limit damages."265 For example, an employer with a com­
prehensive prevention program who takes swift action to correct 
the harassment would protect itself from punitive damages for 
"reckless indifference. "266 Likewise, the employer's prompt reme­
dial action would minimize the actual harm from the harassment, 
thus reducing the compensatory damages claimed by the victim. 
Real equity, though, requires that the trier of fact be allowed 
to weigh the reasonableness of the employer against the victim's 
need for compensation and then allocate the damages accordingly. 
This analytic approach would begin with a "base-line damages fig­
ure" that incorporates the "attack itself" and any "costs of ... medi­
cal and psychological treatment."267 The base-line figure could 
then be reduced by the extent of the employer's reasonableness.268 
All reductions in compensatory damages, however, would be quali­
fied by "the egregiousness of the sexual harassment and the severity 
of the harm to the employee."269 
The mitigated damages approach would compensate victims 
for actual harm and further Title VII's deterrence policy by moti­
262. Harper, supra note 246, at 72. 
263. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998). 
264. Shachter, supra note 232, at 586-88 (advancing a proposed solution that 
would allow employers to mitigate damages through the affirmative defense). 
265. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 243, at note 51 and accompa­
nying text (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 and Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 764 (1998». 
266. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(1) (2000) (au­
thorizing punitive damages against employers who act with "reckless indifference"). 
267. Shachter, supra note 232, at 588. 
268. [d. ("[T]he trier of fact may reduce this base-line award if the defendant 
took efforts to mitigate damages ...."). 
269. Id. at 586. 
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vating employers to avoid excessive monetary losses. For a victim 
like Janet Johnson, this approach to liability would consider the 
particularly severe nature of the "peeping" and the emotional du­
ress that followed, including her inability to remain in the 
workforce and her constant insecurity. Alternatively, Johnson's 
employer could evoke a sympathetic decision from the trier of fact 
by demonstrating that it "[took] corrective measures such as [imme­
diately] firing the supervisor ... or allowing the victim employee to 
take time off"270 to seek medical or psychological care. Remedial 
actions by an employer, although aimed at reducing litigation 
awards, may also facilitate "conciliation rather than litigation" be­
tween mutually reasonable parties.271 Imposing automatic liability 
on an employer for violating Title VII, therefore, does not necessa­
rily end the discussion of damages. Through a mitigated damages 
analysis, courts can provide reasonable employers a level of equita­
ble relief while still adhering to the clear meaning of the affirmative 
defense and the goal of victim compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
Janet Johnson is a hypothetical plaintiff with a hypothetical 
claim, but video voyeurism in the workplace is a harsh and growing 
reality. The Johnson situation illustrates how targets of video 
voyeurism are victimized, and how their lives and careers can be 
altered as a result. Despite the reasonableness of employers, the 
damage suffered by these victims cannot be ignored. 
The numbers cannot be ignored either; video voyeurism is on 
the rise272 and on its way into the workplace.273 To prevent the 
continued increase of victims like Janet Johnson, courts must apply 
Title VII with an open perspective and remain mindful of the need 
for deterrence and compensation. If courts were to deny victims a 
claim under Title VII simply because "peeping" is a more difficult 
type of harassment to reconcile with the Title VII framework, the 
opportunity to prevent further incidents of voyeurism in the work­
place would be lost. 
In the same vein, courts should not seek to avoid employer 
liability by strictly adhering to agency principles or establishing a 
270. Id. at 589. 
271. Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (citing EEOC v. 
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984». 
272. See generally supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text. 
273. See Hawkins, supra note 4, at 52. 
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"modified" affirmative defense274 that disregards the express com­
mand of the Supreme Court. Employer liability, even in situations 
were the employer acts reasonably, is crucial to the advancement of 
Title VII's dual deterrent and compensation purpose. Employers 
are not only more capable of compensating victim than are individ­
ual perpetrators, but employers also have a greater ability to pre­
vent "peeping" in the workplace. The fear of burdening reasonable 
employers with damages should not prevent courts from imposing 
strict liability when it is warranted. Instead, courts can grant em­
ployers equitable relief through a mitigated damages analysis that 
accounts for the employer's reasonableness. 
"Common sense," it has been argued, should serve as a guide 
for judges and juries when analyzing Title VII sexual harassment 
c1aims.275 A common sense solution is exactly what this Note ad­
vances by balancing the interests of a victimized employee and a 
reasonable employer, while still effectuating Congress's intent to 
eradicate workplace discrimination.276 
Shannon D. Leger* 
274. McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004). 
275. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
276. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for an employer to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his com­
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...."). 
* To my teachers, past and present, who have instilled in me the continuing de­
sire to do better. Thank you. "The task of the excellent teacher is to stimulate 'appar­
ently ordinary' people to unusual effort." - K. Patricia Cross 
